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Robert Forrant
Springfield, Massachusetts, the Bay State’s third largest city, suffered
staggering manufacturing job loss over the last thirty years of the twentieth
century. In 2004, the financial impact of job loss, coupled with dubious
fiscal management, plunged the city into near bankruptcy. In response, state
government passed legislation appointing a Finance Control Board to
manage city business. Wage freezes for City workers were continued and
cuts in numerous essential services occurred to deal with the debt. But the
question remains, can a Control Board approach grow a large stock of well
paying jobs — large enough to grow the city’s and the Connecticut River
Valley’s economies?

T

he December 2004 fire that destroyed the closed American Bosch plant
on the Chicopee-Springfield, Massachusetts line and the announced
closing of its neighbor Danaher Tool in the same week are the latest manifestations of Connecticut River Valley deindustrialization. When I visited
the fire scene, it felt like I was at a friend’s wake; vivid memories of my
several years working there flooded back. Workmates had often showed up
for work an hour early, started coffee pots, and spent the time arguing
about sports and politics and bragging about their children. People sold
donuts and newspapers to raise money for their children’s college tuition or
some local charity. The union and company-sponsored Athletic Association
supported teams in the city’s thriving industrial leagues and organized trips
to Red Sox, Bruins, Celtics, Yankees, Rangers, and Knicks games. Every
year the Athletic Association sponsored a children’s Christmas Party and
rented Mountain Park — a local amusement park — for a family outing.
This ended when United Technologies Corporation closed and the plant laid
off over one thousand people in 1986.
Similar job loss occurred along the Connecticut River in East Hartford,
Connecticut, where, riding down Main Street toward the six smokestacks
that dominate the front of Pratt & Whitney’s mammoth aircraft engine
factory, one notices the detritus associated with industrial decline: trash
strewn empty lots, boarded-up storefronts, and vacated triple-deckers —
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former homes of Pratt & Whitney workers. A short drive to the other side
of the Connecticut River exposes the stark difference between East Hartford and downtown Hartford with its glittering insurance companies, banks
and the headquarters of Pratt’s parent, the United Technologies Corporation
(UTC) — known around Hartford as the “Gold Building.” At the union hall
for East Hartford’s International Association of Machinists Local 1746,
opposite the main gates of the plant, local union president Mike Stone told
me: “Well paying, secure jobs, which both provided a career for thousands
of hard working people and their families and supported hundreds of retail
and service establishments across the state — jobs workers in the past were
able to pass along to their children — continue to disappear.”
The social fabric of the once-industrial cities of the Northeastern United
States is being painfully pulled apart. The disappearance of over one million
well paying manufacturing jobs during the recent U.S. recession, added to
the hundreds of thousands of jobs lost in the 1980s and early 1990s, devastated such cities, including Springfield and Hartford. Springfield, the third
largest city in the Bay State, has its second-lowest property values, thirdlowest bond rating, fourth-lowest income per capita, and the highest nonresidential property tax rate in the state; the “perfect storm” for urban
meltdown.
In this article I discuss Springfield’s financial situation in light of the
significant loss of well paying work. Absent such context the city’s plight is
difficult to understand. There is no question the city’s and the region’s
deindustrialization contributed to falling property values, middle class
abandonment of the city, and a sharp increase in public debt as statecollected revenues dropped. By mid-2004 the city became, in effect, the
ward of a state-appointed Finance Control Board (FCB), which sought to
rebalance spending and revenues and streamline the delivery of essential
public services. A critical question this article seeks to answer is whether
the fiscal crisis — the municipal debt that led to the city’s spending takeover
by the FCB — can be resolved with “starve the beast” belt-tightening, wage
freezes, and benefit cuts for city workers, and the slow but steady dismantling of the city’s social services and education infrastructure.
Where are the creative economic development initiatives capable of
producing a new stock of well-paying jobs to replace the ones lost over the
last three decades of the twentieth century and grow the city’s revenues?
Streamlining tax collections, reducing twenty-seven city departments to
eleven divisions, and performing an assessment of city parking services will
not do this, nor will maintaining a wage freeze for all city employees.
Almost one year into the Board’s tenure, one of its few economic development initiatives is to “develop a specific action plan to tear down blighted
houses in the various neighborhoods and to put them back in the hands of
taxpaying citizens.” There is nothing wrong with this particular effort, but
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this is hardly the stuff of sustainable employment creation; something
Springfield desperately needs.1
In the next section, I describe the collapse of the Connecticut River
Valley’s industrial economy — from Springfield south to East Hartford —
and briefly review the growth of service employment. The third section
contrasts the wages of lost industrial jobs with those of the service sector. A
discussion of Springfield’s budget difficulties and the establishment of the
Finance Control Board to oversee the city’s spending follow. A 2004 legislative act established the Board, chaired by the Commonwealth’s Department
of Revenue Commissioner Alan LeBovidge “to initiate and implement
extraordinary remedies to achieve a long-term solution.”2 This section
considers the impact of the city’s spending freeze on teachers, police,
firefighters, and other Springfield employees. Municipal unions sued the city
for almost $10M in negotiated back wages. In 2005 teachers are in their
fourth year without a contractual raise and have been denied previously
negotiated step increases.3 The final section offers my thoughts on what it
will take to revive Springfield and the river valley’s once bustling economy.
Collapse of the River Valley Economy
In his comprehensive industrial history of Massachusetts, Orra Stone
referred to Springfield, the largest city in the Connecticut River valley, as
“a beehive of diversified production.” The skill base attracted England’s
Rolls Royce, Inc. “The artisans of Springfield — from long experience in
fine precision work — were found to possess the same pride in workmanship as the craftsmen of England,” Rolls Royce concluded.4 Henry Ford
praised the city’s metalworkers, “The skill of Springfield’s engineers and
workers is traditional. . . . In its world-wide search for never ending improvements, the Ford Motor Company has found in Springfield dependable
sources for a substantial portion of its equipment and parts used in building
Ford cars.”5 A 1941 Work Projects Administration study noted:
“Springfield’s products have been for the most part the essentials of other
industries, the machines, the tools, and units that turn the wheels of industry
the world over. Because of this inter-relationship and the diversification of
her industries, Springfield has suffered less from economic upheaval than
single-industry cities of New England.”6
What happened to the Bay State’s third largest city, this so-called “industrial beehive,” to generate a $40M budget deficit in 2004 and near economic collapse? Budget mismanagement, an embarrassingly antiquated tax
collection system, a variety of ill-conceived economic development plans,
corruption on a grand scale, and increased crime all contributed to the city’s
demise. The FCB noted: critical transactions of the treasurer, assessor, and
auditor were conducted manually; property tax information was kept on
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3 x 5 cards stored in file cabinets; and ledgers required for overall fiscal
control were balanced by hand.7 But what trumps these factors, and
what makes the city’s situation problematic is something the Control
Board did not address, the steady drip-drip of well paying jobs out of the
city and the region.
In 1956, Future Springfield, Inc. prepared an economic blueprint for
Springfield that identified twelve local manufacturers in the city employing over 1,000 people; by 1965 there were eight, and in 2000, two.8
Closings and layoffs breached the historical continuity of the valley as a
world leader in precision metalworking. Yet little was done to hold onto
the jobs or develop a high wage replacement for the lost work. Now,
rather than analyze the links between job loss and financial meltdown,
political observers and the Control Board foresee a turn-around based on
what a Boston Globe editorial praised as “the containment of personnel
costs.” According to the newspaper, such control “is key to Springfield’s
recovery.”9 But this is not a strategy to return Springfield to even a
semblance of its earlier economic vibrancy.
From the early 1800s through the 1970s, Springfield was the center of
one of the world’s leading industrial districts. Machinery builders and
complimentary metalworking firms along with their highly skilled
workforce constituted an innovative and powerful economic region
stretching one hundred and twenty miles from Bridgeport, Connecticut,
to Windsor, Vermont. The diverse manufacturing base was secured early
in the nineteenth century with Springfield’s selection as the site for an
important federal armory. Skilled machinists and engineers, well-practiced reciprocal relationships among tool builders and their customers,
and the presence of hundreds of small tool-and-die shops enhanced the
valley’s competitiveness. But Westinghouse and American Bosch relocated work out of Springfield starting in the 1950s, the armory closed in
the1960s, and the river valley hemorrhaged blue-collar jobs.10
Between 1969 and 1976, on average, 12 percent of the Massachusetts
job base disappeared annually due to plant closings. Job loss was exacerbated by cuts in defense spending at the conclusion of the Vietnam War.
A second period of sharp job loss occurred between 1988 and 1995 when
manufacturing employment fell to 446,000 from 584,600; by 2000,
statewide manufacturing employment totaled slightly above 430,000.
University of Massachusetts Amherst professor Mark Brenner calculates
that Hampden County (Springfield is the largest city in the County) lost
roughly 43 percent of its industrial employment between 1980 and
2000.11 Table 1 shows the major layoffs and closings in Hampden
County during one dramatic period of employment loss.
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Table 1
Layoffs & Closings
Springfield-Area Metalworking Companies
1982-1990
COMPANY

STATUS

American Bosch
Chapman Valve
Columbia Bicycle
Kidder Stacy
Northeast Wire
Oxford Precision
Package Machinery
Plainville Casting
Portage Casting
Rafferty Steel
Rexnord Roller Chain
Springfield Foundry
Van Norman
Van Valkenberg Plating
Wico Prestolite
Atlas Copco
Easco Hand Tool
Storms Drop Forge

closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
closed
layoffs
layoffs
layoffs

NO. OF JOBS
ELIMINATED

DATE
CLOSED

YEARS
IN CITY

PEAK EMP.
AFTER 1960

1,500
250
250
90
35
60
400
65
60
50
200
75
275
40
250
565
2,000
125

2/86
6/86
6/88
9/89
1990
9/86
9/88
4/87
8/86
11/85
6/89
4/86
10/83
7/86
3/82
1980s
1980s
1980s

800
100+
80+
100+
220
400
100+
650
360
400
100+
100+
900
100+
800
70+
75+
60+

1800
2700
1000
325
125
120
950
75
100
-675
285
1,200
135
675
1,000
2,200
250

As jobs disappeared, city, state, and federal leaders and private developers did little to create employment. Drearily similar “economic blueprints,”
rousing summits, and speeches by development experts rallied the troops,
but produced no “miracle” cure. Chart 1 reveals what has happened to
Massachusetts’s manufacturing and services employment since 1997.
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Chart 1
Massachusetts Manufacturing and Services Employment 1997–2004
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Chart 2 offers a similar look at what transpired in Connecticut: its manufacturing activities are intimately linked with activities in Hampden County.
Manufacturing employment flat-lined in the Commonwealth and slipped
slightly in Connecticut between 2003 and 2004.
Chart 2
Connecticut Manufacturing and Service Employment 1997–2004
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Hampden County’s employment trends are displayed in Chart 3.
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Chart 3
Hampden County Manufacturing and Services Employment
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The lack of a cogent response to job loss exacerbated the employment
crisis over time. Many economic development leaders believed the 1990s
boom — finance, electronics, and biotechnology — would right the ship; it
didn’t. Though the Bay State added almost half a million service-related jobs
from the late1980s through the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of the
well-paying new jobs in high tech, financial services, and biotechnology
were located inside the Interstate 495 beltway, closer to Boston than to
Springfield. A short-lived effort by Wang Computers to develop a computermanufacturing complex in Holyoke, Massachusetts, near Interstate 91 and
a small Digital Equipment production facility in Springfield’s Mason Square
never generated the large numbers of jobs anticipated.
Analyzing federal census data, the Boston Globe’s Sue Kirchoff and Bill
Dedman reported: “Median household income fell during the longest economic expansion in U.S. history in most of the state’s major cities, including
New Bedford, Pittsfield, Springfield, Worcester.” At the same time, incomes
advanced a quarter to a third in many communities along Interstate 495.12
According to the Boston Globe’s Charles Stein “The new economy never
made it this far outside the Massachusetts Turnpike.” Stein summarized: “A
lot of middle-class people left for better economic opportunities, while the
number of poor people grew steadily over the past two decades. This shift
helped make Springfield one of the poorest cities in Massachusetts.”13
Springfield’s unemployment rate reached 8.5 percent as the new century
opened, and climbed far higher in several of the city’s Hispanic and African
American neighborhoods. Soon streetlights were turned off to save revenue
and police, fire, and school jobs were cut.
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Springfield’s hopes for a recovery seemed to rest on a $110M riverfront
development project to be anchored by the new Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame and a $71M renovation of its downtown civic center,
which, it was hoped, would attract convention dollars. The Hall has not
generated the visits consultants predicted, nor is there much evidence that
well-paying jobs will materialize along the riverfront, which is isolated from
the downtown by a six-lane raised highway. Indeed, most of the riverfront is
difficult to get to, as there are several railroad tracks along the riverbank.
In addition, much of the 14,000 square feet of retail space attached to the
Hall is empty, and it is difficult to envision Hall visitors navigating their
way to the city’s Main Street for a bite to eat when downtown restaurants
are not visible from the Hall’s parking lot. Most of my friends from the
eastern part of the Bay State, who tour the Hall, buy their tee shirts there
and jump right back on the highway. And with a family restaurant across
the parking lot, none of them have gone to Main Street for a pizza at Red
Rose before or after their visit!14

A Job’s a Job, Right?
In Massachusetts job creation has remained sluggish in 2004 and 2005 and
the sectors adding jobs — education & health services and leisure & hospitality — on average paid wages below the wages of the lost manufacturing
sector jobs. Good manufacturing wages generated tax revenues and translated into the purchase of goods and services from other businesses. Wellpaid workers took their families out to eat. Well-paid, secure workers
bought a new car, truck, or snowmobile every few years. Well-paid workers
supported their local schools, churches, and athletic and social clubs. In
addition, a good deal of what got made in the region was for export, thus
bringing additional revenue into the region. Policymakers and economic
development professionals should not turn their backs on efforts to hold
onto the industrial jobs that remain. And they should do everything possible
to generate new ones in emerging technology fields related to biotechnology, medical instruments, environmental testing devices, and
nanotechnology.
There are at least six reasons why we should care about the historic shifts
in the greater-Springfield employment base.
•

First, blue-collar know-how has always been a critical source of the
state’s competitive advantage and the basis for many innovations. This
is in jeopardy.

•

Second, well-paid industrial workers pay local and state taxes that help
fund schools and fuel growth in the retail sector, restaurants, and home
building.
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•

Third, steady wages enable workers to send their daughters and sons to
college and help reproduce the state’s vaunted skill base.

•

Fourth, a statewide infrastructure of hundreds of small and mediumsized metalworking, plastics, and precision manufacturing firms relied
on lucrative contracts from companies like American Bosch and Pratt &
Whitney.

•

Fifth, wages in services lag behind manufacturing wages.

• Sixth, median household income in Western Massachusetts industrial
cities is well below the state average of $50,502. The numbers are as
follows: Greenfield, $33,110; Holyoke, $30,441; North Adams, $27,601;
Pittsfield, $35,655; Springfield, $30,417. Springfield’s wage figure helps
us understand its present financial condition.
In 2001, I discussed the problem of job loss with the International Association of Machinists District 91 directing business representative James
Parent, who noted that companies “don’t realize that when they talk about
a worker, it’s not just one worker. They are talking about a whole family
whose future is up in the air.”15 In July 2004, Connecticut Governor Jodi
Rell had it right when she remarked, “The bottom line is it’s all about jobs.
It’s jobs. It’s jobs. It’s jobs.”16
In September 2004, I discussed the employment situation with three Pratt
& Whitney workers who had been laid off at one time or another since
2001. Two were recalled to work in Middletown and one hoped for “good
news” soon. They all wanted to be recalled because they could not find jobs
that paid anywhere near their wages at Pratt. One worker drove a soda
delivery truck in greater New Haven fifty-five to sixty hours a week. The
second, with several years of experience as an aircraft engine mechanic,
worked part-time at Home Depot and Walmart. He eventually “got lucky,”
finding full-time work at a new Bed Bath & Beyond store. But once the store
settled into a routine, his hours were slashed. He estimated that he earned
about 30 percent of his former wage and worked more hours. The third
person sold clothing in a department store at 50 percent of his former hourly
wage and averaged just twenty-five hours a week. In their late thirties and
early forties, they always worked and diligently sought employment once
they were laid off. All three complained about the physical stress and
anxiety associated with employment and income loss and in particular with
the loss of their medical insurance. They stopped going out to eat and to the
movies, made the television and car last longer and stopped saving for their
children’s college education.17
When American Bosch closed in 1986, a prescient editorial appeared in
the Holyoke Transcript-Telegram (now also closed). It cautioned readers
that the service economy everyone put so much faith in too often produced
jobs that required little skill, offered low pay, and provided few benefits. To
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a large degree this remains the case in 2005. A look at what happened to
manufacturing and services wages statewide is contained in Table 2.
Table 2
Massachusetts Inflation Adjusted Wages 1997–2003
Statewide
Manufacturing
Services

1997

1999

2001

2003

$ 857
$1120
$ 747

$ 906
$1199
$ 781

$ 939
$1201
$ 810

$ 929
$1116
$ 876

The gap between manufacturing and services pay is not closing appreciably.
This matters because the U.S. Department of Labor recently reported
“Industries ranked in the bottom fifth for wages and salaries have added
477,000 jobs since January 2004, while industries in the top fifth for wages
had no increases at all.”18 For Massachusetts, the three occupations adding
the most jobs — cashiers, food preparation and serving workers and waiters
and waitresses — paid average wages below $10 an hour in 2003. In 2003,
nine of the fifteen largest occupations in the Bay State reported average
wages under $15 an hour. “Given the high cost of living in Massachusetts
this proliferation of low-wage jobs is a major public policy challenge.”19
What do we know about Hampden County employment and wage
trends? The gap between manufacturing and services wages increased
between 2001 and 2004. Manufacturing employment continued to erode,
while services added employment between 1998 and 2002 and then tailed
off through 2004.
Table 3
Hampden County
Manufacturing and Services Employment 1998–2004

Manufacturing
Services

1998
34,301
86,455

2000
37,157
98,979

2002
34,223
107,035

2004
28,081
95,734

As for wages, the gap between services and manufacturing widen over the
period under review.
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Chart 4
Hampden County Manufacturing and Services Wages 2001-2004
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Commenting on August 2004 employment data New York Times
business reporter Louis Uchitelle noted layoffs are “more frequent now in
good times and bad, than they were in similar cycles a decade ago.”20
Across the country, the almost 60 percent of laid-off workers who found a
job earned less money, compared with about 50 percent of workers who
went through the same experience in the early 1990s. In other words, both
the number of new jobs and wages paid in them continues to moderate, so
that even when employment growth occurs, the wealth base is eroded.
Michael Yates confirms these trends. “For a nation as rich as the
United States, there are a very large number of low-paying jobs. One of the
most interesting data sets in the SWA [State of Working America] shows
that for the fraction of jobs which pay an hourly wage rate insufficient to
support a family of four at the poverty level of income with full-time, yearround work.” One-quarter of all jobs pay at or below poverty wages; for
Blacks the figure is 30.4 percent and for Hispanic workers 39.8 percent. For
Black women the figure is 33.9 percent and for Hispanic women, 45.8
percent.21 There can be no question that this is what occurred in Springfield.
Thus, absent a sharp tax increase or the infusion of new revenues from the
state or federal government to make up for lost taxes and local spending by
workers, essential services — education, youth programs, and police and
fire protection — are cut back, and jobs that depend on disposable income,
like restaurants, disappear.
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Springfield on the Brink:
The Finance Control Board in Charge
We return to Springfield. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, median
household income fell in several of the Commonwealth’s industrial cities
even during the 1990s expansion.22 After the 2001 recession, these cities fell
further behind their “inside Route 495” counterparts. For Springfield,
according to Robert Nakosteen, a professor of economics and statistics at
the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst, this generated a structural problem due to the city’s “inability to
depend on its own tax base. All the wealth just moved out of the city.”23
William Ward, of the Hampden County Regional Employment Board, notes
that while well-paying work disappeared far too often, the replacement
wages for workers fortunate enough to find a new job lagged well behind
the pay and benefits they lost.24
The city’s 2004 crisis should not have caught anyone off guard. Budget
difficulties reached back to the 1980s and the mid-1990s when the city
received a $21M state loan and sold its municipally owned hospital to a
private company to cover budget shortfalls.25 Now, the greatest attention is
being paid to bringing costs in line with projected city revenues mainly
through cuts in essential services and a “substantial reduction of personnel
costs and expenses” in the words of the Control Board. For city workers,
this translates to a wage freeze and an attack on their collective bargaining
rights, but for the Board, “Some combination of increases in economic
productivity, reduction in wages and benefits, and work rule changes must
be accomplished if the city is to have annual balanced budgets.” Control
Board Chairman LeBovidge summarized in September 2004: “It is clear that
an integral part of the recovery plan for the city of Springfield must include
work rule changes, benefits restructuring and take-home pay reductions for
municipal workers.”26
In 2004, a Boston Herald editorial referred to Springfield as “a financial
basket case.”27 In mid-June 2004, reporter Dan Ring described the situation:
“Although Springfield is the third-largest city in the Commonwealth out of
351 municipalities it has the lowest bond rating, the fourth-lowest income
per capita, the second-lowest property values and the highest nonresidential
property tax rate in the state.”28 Fire stations closed on a rotating basis,
school personnel were drastically reduced, city streets went un-cleaned, and
the Massachusetts State Police assisted the understaffed police department
on the weekends. In 2005 Springfield, according to a Hartford Courant
story, was still “a city under siege.”29
To stave off bankruptcy city officials, the Romney administration, and
the legislature crafted a bailout bill in mid-2004. At first the governor
offered a $20M grant and a $30M interest-free loan to cover the shortfall
in the $437M FY2004 budget, so long as the city agreed to allow a state-
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appointed control board to make future spending decisions. The proposal
called for the suspension of collective bargaining for the city’s twenty-nine
municipal unions.30 The initial plan stalled in the legislature in part because
of its approach to the unions. According to Ken Donnelly, secretary treasurer of the Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts, “He’s trying to
break the unions. I haven’t seen anything this bad in 32 years.” For Timothy
Collins, president of the Springfield Education Association, the proposed
control board plan represented “the lowest day of my life when you have a
mayor and a governor stripping us of our collective bargaining rights. It’s
almost un-American. Shame on the governor and shame on the mayor.” Ken
Pooler, representing Public Works Employees noted that his union had 364
members in 1999 and in mid-2004 it had 208 members. Union leaders
argued that further workforce cuts and wage freezes would negatively
impact the provision of essential protective and educational services and
over time cause more residents to leave, further shrinking the revenue base.
Eventually the wage freeze was implemented, leading to, among other
things, the exodus of some two hundred teachers from the city’s public
schools during the 2004–2005 academic year. For the city’s International
Brotherhood of Police Officers local president Thomas Scanlon the FCB
“was trying something to break the union and if they do it here, they’ll take
it right across the state.”31
After weeks of wrangling in the spring and summer of 2004, city officials,
the legislature, and the governor agreed to a plan that allowed the city to
borrow from a $52M interest-free loan to be paid back by 2012. The $52M
figure matched what the city was owed in delinquent property taxes.32 The
FCB took control for three years and in its first order of business approved a
budget for the rest of FY2005, with the wage-freeze its centerpiece. For the
FCB:
No solution to the city’s fiscal crisis can be achieved without a suchstantial
reduction tion of personnel costs and expenses. It is clear that an integral part
of the recovery plan for the city of Springfield must include work rule
changes, benefits restructuring and take-home pay reductions for municipal
employees.33

According to Eric Kriss, the governor’s Secretary for Administration and
Finance, the Board was “a tool to help the city recover financially.”34
Ironically, Kriss contended that a turnaround was possible only with the
good will and effort of municipal employees. But, with some 20 percent of
the city’s workforce cut since 2002 and wage freezes, neutral observers
found it difficult to imagine why city workers would rubber stamp FCB
decisions.35 A Republican editorial offered: “While we agree that work rule
and benefit changes need to be made regarding city employees, we vigorously oppose the reduction of their wages and think it would be unconscionable to do so.” For good measure it added: “The Control Board should be
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working for a surgical plan to restore the city’s finances, not a hatchet job
that leaves the city as nothing more than a comatose patient on life support.”36
By summer 2005, one year into the Control Boards reign, there remained
a paucity of serious and broad-based public debate about how the city
might restore its job base and how the region might generate significant
numbers of well-paying jobs. The Control Board remained focused on fiscal
issues. There is no doubt management problems exist, along with widespread corruption in several city agencies including the Springfield Housing
Authority, the Massachusetts Career Development Institute, the Hampden
County Employment and Training Consortium, and Friends of the Homeless, Inc. But the failure to engage in a purposeful and region-wide strategy
to preserve existing well-paying work and generate more and better jobs
means there is little reason to expect the downward spiral in public service
cuts to end soon.
For example, making the way forward contingent on wage and benefits
cuts for teachers only jeopardizes the quality of the city’s educational
system, an essential part of any long-term recovery plan that attracts new,
and well-paying employment possibilities. Without sustained employment
growth, revenues and expenditures can come into line only if Springfield
curtails public spending on education, child and elder services, police and
fire protection and education.37 One of the Board’s most public confrontations is with the Springfield Education Association as the Board attempts to
abrogate negotiated pay raises and push through a labor agreement that
will, in some cases, pay new teachers to the system more money than
veteran classroom teachers.38
Historically, New England’s education and training system satisfied the
skill demands of employers and the river valley usually got high marks for
its public schools and the large number of college graduates who lived in
Western Massachusetts. In 1980 economist John Hekman noted that the
most important factor in locating high technology firms is “high skills and
scientific workers.” For Hekman, New England’s economic strength derived
from its ability to provide various “highly specialized resources” required
by firms engaged in “the design or production of their product” while “still
in the innovation stage.” When the mass production stage of a good is
reached, “production has tended to migrate out of New England.” Hekman
and co-author John Strong described why certain kinds of firms settled in
New England and by extension the Connecticut River valley:
Areas like New England have a large number of firms which change their
products and production processes frequently. Change means restructur
ing, learning new methods, testing, and experimenting. While a company
which produces a large volume of output using a well-defined and un
changing production processes looks to site its plants in low cost areas with little
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regard for distance from headquarters, companies which are changing and developing usually must keep a close watch on production. The combination of first, the
need for specialized skills and, second, the changing nature of a firm’s need for
resources helps keep industrial agglomerations together.39

New England’s declining post–Second World War economic performance
ought to have been discussed with some degree of urgency. The President’s
Council of Economic Advisers called attention to the situation in the early
1950s. It concluded that the region’s firms were turning from their historical
strengths: skill development, technological innovation, and the diffusion of
new production methods. The purchase of valley firms by conglomerates
exacerbated the erosion of shop-floor skills, as one after another, new
owners disbanded apprenticeship programs, concentrating instead on
training foremen to “get the work out.” Finally, the search for the next
cheap place to get things made supplanted the valley’s “age of skill.” Even
the Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts’ third largest employer, succumbed
in 1968 and the city’s Chamber of Commerce renamed the “Industrial
Beehive” the “City of Homes.”40 One wonders what an appropriate nickname is in 2005.
Globalization increased the international labor pool and made capital
and work more mobile. Firms globalized corporate assets and expanded
their direct foreign investment in factories, office buildings, office equipment, and machine tools. The Connecticut River Valley did not escape these
seismic shifts in employment and investment. As organized labor’s ranks
thinned and manufacturing declined, communities scrambled to save what
jobs they could by offering corporations financial inducement to stay or
move into their town.41 This resulted in wage depression, declining household wealth, increasing income inequality, a degraded quality of life in older
industrial regions like Greater Springfield, and bitter battles between unions
and employers in the private and public sectors.
In December 1998 IAM District 91 reached agreement on a three-year
contract with Pratt & Whitney. At the time the company indicated that
about 1,000 additional jobs might be eliminated due to what it termed
“production scheduling problems.” But unionists were assured that no rerun
of the drastic cuts that took place five years earlier was anticipated. Company officials emphasized that Pratt & Whitney was committed to Connecticut. Increased orders for very lucrative engine repairs and services
were expected to boost jobs. Eight months later Krapek announced that
Pratt would relocate engine repair and service work to Oklahoma and
Texas and shutter a factory in Connecticut. As news of the cuts spread,
Gary Daly, age forty-eight with twenty years of service at Pratt, typified
worker reactions when he said that the company is “making record profits,
and all they want is cheap labor, to bust the union. We’ve got mortgages
and families and are trying to send our kids to school. What are we going to
do, flip burgers?” Back then, turret lathe operator and IAM Executive
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Board member Ted Durkin noted that there were some jobs available
paying decent wages that required considerable training. “I’m 45 and lots of
other workers are older. Not too many folks will want to start all over again
and go back to school.” There are far fewer of these jobs in 2005. Retailers
and casinos are the job creators now.42
Final Thoughts
For most of the last two centuries the Connecticut River Valley — with
Springfield as its leading city — related to the rest of the country and the
world as a stellar manufacturing center. Its metalworkers and machinery
builders fueled the nation’s industrial revolution. In historical succession
industries including textiles, paper, shoes, rifles and handguns, industrial
machinery, aircraft engines, and computers generated spectacular wealth
and advanced workers’ living standards. Metalworking growth stemmed
from three related factors: continuous innovations in product design and
development stimulated by the Springfield Armory; a nucleus of locallyowned, collaborative, machine tool builders and precision metalworking
firms whose expertise provided the region with the first-mover benefits of
any technological breakthroughs; and the base of skilled workers performing the precision machining required to turn out world-class products.43
Just as the river valley did before and immediately after the Civil War,
today’s prosperous “learning regions” require workers able and willing to
apply their intelligence at work, supported by an education and training
infrastructure that facilitates the life-long learning required for knowledgeintensive production. Over the years the state and municipal governments
have too often neglected this important asset while they searched for the
silver bullet that would solve their problems. As precision metalworking
jobs and the skill base cultivated up and down the Connecticut River Valley
for over a century disappeared, too few policy makers and economic development officials asked: What next? Where will the area’s well-paying work
come from? How can we educate the people who are losing their jobs so
that they can transition to other high-paying work? How can we leverage
the tremendous research and education resources of the Connecticut River
Valley’s numerous colleges and universities to engage in long-term efforts to
rebuild the employment infrastructure? How can we head off the economic
misery that confronts working families?
The Springfield Armory was the original catalyst for development of the
Connecticut River Valley. Its willingness to diffuse technical knowledge to
its contractors spread best practice, and its ability to attract and train
skilled mechanics laid the foundation of a highly skilled workforce. In turn,
this served as a repository of knowledge, one means of incorporating new
technical information, and the source of highly innovative new business
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startups. This is not unlike what Silicon Valley did for California.
Burgeoning expertise in machine tool technology laid the foundation for a
capital goods sector that interacted with emerging industries to create a
diverse manufacturing base. Both benefited from learning processes within
networks of machine builders, small specialist engineering shops, education
and training institutions, and final goods producers. The strong shop-floor
skill base, combined with innovative and forward-looking employers,
provided the region with a competitive advantage for close to one hundred
and fifty years.
The region’s productive system reached its zenith during the Second
World War. Now a “New Armory,” a new catalyst for sustainable prosperity is required. Fiscal belt-tightening, a long-term freeze on teachers’ wages,
and fanciful notions that tourist attractions will somehow grow a plentiful
supply of well-paying jobs cannot arrest the city and region’s slump. The
region is in danger of having its skilled labor base permanently eroded.
Cutting back on public education depletes the skill base needed in the
twenty-first century. A 2003 report prepared by Northeastern University’s
Center for Labor Market Studies drew on a series of focus group discussions with greater Springfield manufacturers. Employers noted that math
and technical ability were essential for employees and that they were
having a hard time finding qualified workers to operate new, advanced
technologies essential if firms in the region were to remain globally competitive. Co-operation, collective action among the region’s trade associations,
trade unions, educational institutions, and supportive state and federal
agencies is essential for meaningful job creation.44 Closing libraries and
museums harms the city’s attractiveness as a place of learning. Balancing
budgets by attacking municipal unions and battling in court over whether to
pay negotiated pay increases does not build anything.45
Is there an Armory-like catalyst out there? It is difficult to say, but the
river valley is blessed with fourteen higher education institutions, many of
them richly endowed and most paying scant attention to the importance of
sustainable regional social and economic development. The colleges in
Springfield must realize that cuts to public education will impact their flow
of local students and that the negative publicity about the city’s decline well
might cut into applications. The University of Massachusetts Amherst is
roughly twenty-five miles from Springfield and also has a stake in the well
being of the Bay State’s third largest city. Poised for growth in Springfield’s
North End — on ground made vacant by the demise of metalworking — is a
rich medical research complex with the potential to generate thousands of
well paying jobs if the regional workforce is given the proper education and
training and colleges and universities generate a research agenda focused,
in part, on employment creation and the establishment of linkages with
existing metalworking and plastics firms still in the Connecticut River
Valley.
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The Pioneer Valley Life Sciences Institute, a partnership between Bay
State Medical Center and the University of Massachusetts Amherst could
conceivably stimulate a boom in research spending and well paying work.
Elsewhere I have analyzed the workings of two of the state’s important
manufacturing sectors, metalworking and plastics, and there is evidence
that both sectors are important to the state’s medical equipment and biotechnology industries.46 Metalworking, plastics, and biotechnology comprise
several thousand well paying manufacturing, research, marketing and
business services jobs that we can not afford to lose. How do these industries intersect? Metalworking firms supply the leading edge equipment
companies need to increase their productivity, enhance their quality, and
compete in the global economy on the basis of cost and innovation. Plastics
firms are important customers for the state’s sophisticated mold making
companies, while biotech firms purchase measuring and testing equipment
from the state’s precision toolmakers and plastics firms.
To flourish, the rich intersection of firms needs to be stimulated by clever
industrial and economic development policies that reward innovation,
heighten skills development, and promote collaboration across the Commonwealth. Investments in the higher education technology infrastructure
for nanotechnology and other emerging fields, particularly in the Life
Sciences, need to be boosted if the state’s firms are to remain competitive
with firms in New York, North Carolina, Texas, California, and in the
developing world. Increased spending on biology laboratories in high
schools and on education for our future biotechnology and nanotechnology
workforces should have commenced several years ago. Southern states now
recruit Massachusetts biotech firms with promises of state-of-the-art education and training facilities. And, perhaps not so glamorous in the public’s
eye, steps must be taken to hold onto and rebuild the skill base of precision
machinists and metalworkers for a rapidly aging population threatens to
break a historical continuity that stretches back to the early nineteenth
century.
Rich consultant fees to outside academic experts may provide some with
a nice lunch, but they have little long-lasting impact. The region’s mainstream and grassroots public and private economic development agencies
and organizations and this rich knowledge creation infrastructure need to
join forces with the valley’s unions and employers to generate a social and
economic development plan for the future. The “New Armory”— a catalyst
for growth and the antithesis of the solution offered by the Finance Control
Board — is out there if folks look in the right places.
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SINCE
Folks

are still looking for the “New Armory.” The state-controlled Finance
Control Board ran the city from 2004 through most of 2009. The Republican
newspaper’s Mike Plaisance summarized what the Control Board accomplished
in a lengthy article on June 27, 2009.
“Five years ago, the Finance Control Board arrived to rescue this
city. No rose-strewn paths greeted these state-imposed saviors, who
consisted of three appointees of former Gov. W. Mitt Romney, then
Mayor Charles V. Ryan and Domenic J. Sarno, and the future
mayor who was then president of the City Council. They soon
learned what Ryan and Sarno already knew: Running a $41 million
deficit and seemingly devoid of mechanisms to help itself, the
state's third-largest city really was collapsing. “The city was
insolvent, which means that it did not have the capacity to pay its
bills. It reneged on the contracts it had with its employees. The city
was owed (nearly) $50 million in back taxes,” Ryan said.
So now what? When the Control Board’s tenure ended the city had $34.5
million in cash reserves, with $54.8 million set aside for other uses and controls
in place that restricted spending. Set up by Republican Governor Mill Romney
and supported by Democrat, Governor Deval L. Patrick, Plaisance wrote that not
all was ‘hearts and flowers. “Fear, pain, bitterness and relief, not to mention
lawsuits and lots of politicking, all had roles in the control-board era…”1 City
schools lost over 1,300 experienced teachers to better-paying jobs in nearby
communities. Teachers, along with police, firefighters and members of other
municipal unions—the city has about 6,500 employees—forfeited much of the
cash due to them from a wage freeze. For Teachers Union president Tim Collins
a big part of the multimillion-dollar cash-reserve cushion the Control Board
bragged of consists of the pay raises union workers lost.
While this is disputed by the Control Board the fact remains that wages and
benefits cuts were a significant part of the Board’s restructuring of city finances. 2
Now that the Control Board has departed the city, the way forward, according to
the city’s mayor and many other civic leaders, is casinos.
According to an article in the Boston Globe “As many as four top-tier casino
developers have informed Springfield officials that they would like to build a
gambling resort in this struggling city on the Connecticut River, a level of interest
unmatched in other parts of the state…”
Indeed, Springfield Mayor Domenic J. Sarno noted, “We’re ground zero,
baby.”3 However, a 2010 report by researchers from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston hints at the fact that Springfield’s jobs crisis cannot be solved by
employment policies designed to spend public treasure luring casinos to town.
Robert Forrant is a professor in the Department of History and Program in Regional
Economic and Social Development, University of Massachusetts Lowell.
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Researchers from the Bank released a 2010 report examining “the
availability of jobs across Springfield’s neighborhoods and in nearby cities and
towns.” Their study analyzed data that overlaps a few years of the Control Board’s
reign. While the study focused on the extent to which the city’s employment
problems stem from issues related to job availability or accessibility as opposed
to the qualifications of jobseekers in the local labor pool, for purposes here they
concluded that the “number of available jobs in the Springfield area (about
76,000 within the city itself plus another 90,000 or so within a 10-mile radius of
the city) is not abnormally low for a city with a working-age population of
113,000. The problem is that Springfield residents face significant barriers to
being hired into, and/or remaining employed in area jobs.”4
To overcome this situation they note that the leisure and hospitality sectors
need to hire more people from inner-city neighborhoods. At the same time,
“Expanded training, internship, mentorship, outreach, and other human capitalrelated programs are necessary in order to prepare more Springfield residents for
employment. In addition, transportation enhancements or downtown job
creation may be needed to improve their access to jobs in certain sectors.”5 The
authors conclude, “In order for Springfield’s resident employment to increase
without decreasing the employment of current jobholders who live outside the
city, Springfield and its surrounding region must engage in aggressive job
creation efforts.”6
Over the previous 200 years working people flocked to Springfield, Hartford,
and the Connecticut River Valley for the well-paying jobs they could find there.
Now young people voted with their feet and moved on if they could, while too
many working people were trapped in their neighborhoods unable to sell their
homes as the regional economy failed them.
Once in charge, the Control Board focused on a handful of symptoms of
distress, but it failed to address the historical relationship between the
disappearance of well-paying work and the city’s plight. No one in a responsible
position discussed how the loss of half of greater-Springfield’s manufacturing
plants between 1950 and 1987 accompanied by the loss of 43 percent of
Hampden County’s industrial employment between 1980 and 2000 affected the
city’s finances. The cumulative impact of the closings and layoffs breached the
historical continuity of the valley as a world leader in precision metalworking.
And, it was equally obvious that new high-wage replacement work had not
materialized. Yet, from 2004 to 2010, rather than focus at least a modicum of
attention on job creation and economic development, the Control Board centered
its turnaround strategy primarily on the “containment of personnel costs.”7 This
failure to focus on growing Springfield out of its budget mess, meant recovery
remained elusive. In April 2007 the Executive Director of the Control Board
reported that the city “faces a $3.2 million budget deficit for the fiscal year
starting July 1 and deficits for the following
three fiscal years” if it tries to pay back the original loan by 2009 as the enabling
legislation required.8
By July 2009, things had gotten so bad that “even the trees were falling—their
dead limbs crashing onto parked cars and into houses, spurring lawsuits against
the city that could not afford to cut the trees down.”9
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The Board’s term was extended to 2009 in mid-2007 when it became apparent
that Springfield wouldn’t be able to pay the loan back by 2012, a requirement of
the enabling legislation. And, despite the arguments from union leaders that job
cuts and wage freezes would negatively impact the provision of essential
protective and educational services and cause residents to leave the city, the
Board instituted a wage freeze. Teachers’ previously negotiated pay increases
were held back, causing the exodus of nearly 250 teachers during the 2004-2005
academic years alone. In early 2005 Springfield was referred to as “a city under
siege.”10
In one of its first public statements, the Board informed residents that:
“No solution to the city’s fiscal crisis can be achieved without a
substantial reduction of personnel costs and expenses. It is clear
that an integral part of the recovery plan for the city of Springfield
must include work rule changes, benefits restructuring and takehome pay reductions for municipal employees.”11
_____________________________
The Catalyst: “The New
Springfield Armory?”
The original catalyst for economic development in the Connecticut River Valley
was the Springfield Armory. For most of the last two centuries the Connecticut
River Valley, with Springfield as its leading city, related to the rest of the country
and the world as a stellar manufacturing center, its metalworkers and machinery
builders fueling the nation’s industrial revolution. Metalworking growth stemmed
from three related factors: continual innovations in product design and
development stimulated by the Springfield Armory; a nucleus of locally-owned,
collaborative, machine-tool builders and precision metalworking firms whose
expertise provided the region with the first-mover benefits of any technological
breakthroughs; and the base of skilled workers performing the precision machining
required to turn out world-class products; dealing cards and cutting city workers’
pensions pales by comparison. Burgeoning expertise in machine-tool technology
provided the basis for a capital goods sector, which, together with emerging
industries created a diverse manufacturing base supported by a well-paid working
class.
The productive system reached its zenith during the Second World War.
Thereafter, Springfield and the region were caught up in the accelerated pace of
globalization, and the skill base was no longer a sufficient magnet to preserve and
increase well-paying work. Once locally owned firms changed hands, their assets
were globalized, and the region’s ability to shape and reshape its economic future
slipped away. Springfield scrambled to save what jobs they could, offering
corporations financial inducement to stay or move in.
Springfield and nearby Hartford, Connecticut, even engaged in a ludicrous
‘border war’, each city’s mayor offering inducements to firms to move employment
approximately 30 miles north or south along Route 91. While politicians fiddled, the
skill base disappeared. East Hartford, Connecticut and Springfield—once home to
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major industries—suffered years of falling living standards and sharp population
losses as a result of the collective failure to develop a new ‘Armory,’ a new catalyst
for sustainable prosperity. It is hard to imagine casinos being that catalyst.
Now in 2012 it can be stated that none of the measures taken by the Control
Board arrested the horrible slump in jobs. Of course, some of this mess was
certainly exacerbated by the national economic recession. And, in my opinion, the
aggressively top-down nature of the Control Board hampered any serious and longterm community-wide conversations about how to re-grow the employment base.
Years into the Control Board’s rule, unions representing teachers, police, and
firefighters still fought through the courts for their legally negotiated pay increases.
A 23-yearold-forklift operator expressed the feelings of many residents: “Just get it
over with. To know your city is going broke—it’s time to move out of here. There’s
no opportunity here.”12 Tim Collins, president of the Springfield Education
Association, and an outspoken critic of the Control Board, summed up events
thusly:
“These political leaders have starved this city into this situation, so
they could put forward their Draconian agenda. And the leadership
of the Legislature is letting the city fail because they want to give
Romney a black eye as he runs for president.”13
In July 2007, Democrat, Deval Patrick, was elected governor and he put several
new members on the Board and for the first time the Board talked about how it
might stimulate economic development. Calls were made for colleges and
universities to lend their expertise to the monumental task of finding several new
“engines of prosperity” for the valley, ones that might match the skills and
innovation that had previously propelled the regional economy forward. But little
has been accomplished on this front.
In the end, the challenges and impacts of globalization and industrial atrophy on
older industrial cities proved too much for the Control Board and its allies. While
the financials look better, it is hard to make the case that the quality of life for many
city residents has improved. And, it would be equally difficult to make the case that
young people graduating from the city’s high schools and area colleges and
universities have great expectations about job possibilities in and around the city.
So, after five years of the Control Board and three years for the changes in city
practices it introduced to sink in, the jury remains out on Springfield’s future. For
me, the directional signs in Springfield are not encouraging.
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